Non Lethal Devices:
The Violent Man Scenario
Part One: Current Tactics & Debate
A time for change?
Introduction
In 1997 after a 6-month
countrywide trial, the Metropolitan Police introduced the use of CS aerosol
incapacitant as a tactical option for police officers. CS irritant comes under
the broad heading of a less than lethal device or weapon, which in essence can
be defined as having the potential ability of incapacitating a subject with a
reduced likelihood of long term injury or fatality. CS irritant is amongst a
vast array of chemical and other non-lethal devices offered on the world-wide
market and used by various police and law enforcement agencies around the
world. The issue of CS aerosol incapacitant should be seen as a turning point
in the whole concept of officer safety and the dawn of a new debate.
Contemporary policing is moving at a rapid pace with sadly confrontation and
violence becoming the norm. This indicates the need to develop solutions at a
pace that matches the speed of our changing society. What needs to be explored
now and the question asked:
Is there a more effective and
competent non-lethal technology available now or in the near future?
Examining
the facts
So what evidence is there
to justify the expansion of non-lethal devices, within British policing operations?
Detailed examination of police tactics dealing with violent situations (both
pre planned and spontaneous) can highlight areas of weakness in current
tactical responses. One recent tragic event that has highlighted such issues,
is the murder of PC Nina Mackay in October 1997. This was followed several
weeks later by an officer being injured by a male armed with a hammer. Both
these officers where from the same specialist unit, engaged in supporting local
officers with incidents which were beyond the resources of every day policing.
By contrast patrolling
officer's faced with violent persons on the street are usually confronted very
suddenly in close contact situations which require quick instinctive responses.
Certainly now within many forces the patrolling officer in the event of
confrontation has CS spray, baton and quick cuffs at their disposal in
implementing restraint and incapacitation by reasonable force. Sadly, there are
recent events, which indicate that these options are also clearly lacking and
not effective when facing certain violent scenarios. Especially where the
violence directed towards officers comes from suspects who are mentally ill, or
intoxicated through drugs or alcohol. Such an example was demonstrated by the
recent incident in Kent where a violent suspect who was drunk assaulted two
PC's. One officer was hit repeatedly by her own ASP baton, as well as suffering
from the effects of the CS spray that was intended to incapacitate the suspect.
This demonstrates that in certain situations, current non-lethal alternatives
are not only ineffective but also detrimental to the safety of the officers
concerned. Initially I believe that two areas of research need to be
implemented.
1.
To
examine other non-lethal alternatives for the patrolling officer, which will
allow him or her to quickly deploy a more effective option in close contact
spontaneous confrontations.
2.
To
examine more specialised non lethal alternatives for officers having to respond
to situations which have the potential for extreme violence and have been
deemed to be beyond the resources of normal everyday policing. Such units by
their nature would be better equipped and trained to deal with such incidents.
SHIELD
TACTICS (Current UK tactics for dealing with Violent, and highly dangerous
persons, who may be armed (non-Firearm)).
The Metropolitan Police
following ACPO guidelines respond to incidents involving violent and highly
dangerous suspects in the following manner. Having identified a situation is
beyond the resources of conventional every day police tactics (and the suspect
did not fall into the category as so dangerous that they could not be
restrained without the use of firearms). The normal response would be to call
for the assistance of specialist Territorial Support Group officers (or if
unavailable divisional shield trained officers). These officers would equip
themselves with protective personal equipment (Nato helmet, body armour etc)
and using long polycarbonate shields enter premises or approach the suspect and
detain him. This tactic requires initially closing the suspect down and the use
of shields for a dual purpose:
1.
As a
barrier to protect the officers from assault.
2.
Ultimately
physically restrain the suspect with the shields.
In summary to highlight the
associated risk of the current tactic we can break it down further.
Primarily, officers have to
locate the suspect and if inside premises initially gain entry.
Then having located the
suspect, close the suspect down and physically restrain him with the shields.
This whole tactic relies on getting as close to the suspect as possible with
only the barrier of a shield between the suspect and officers. This entirely
goes against the whole ethos of officer safety of creating and maintaining
distance from suspects.
As is often demonstrated
in training and sadly also shown operationally, the risks are high and a
committed violent individual or mentally ill person could easily breach the
defences of the shields and injure officers.
It takes a well-trained
and physically fit unit to effectively carry out such tactics. The technique of
using the shields can be physically very tiring and when facing a particularly
resourceful or committed individual, officers can quickly tire providing
opportunities for errors.
The incident of the TSG
officer injured by a male armed with a hammer highlights the fact that a shield
is also vulnerable to a sustained frenzied attack with a blunt instrument. It
demonstrates that shields do break, resulting in the officer being exposed to
the full force of any assault.
The sheer physical nature of
the tactic also leaves the suspect open to injury and the officers involved
susceptible to complaint or litigation.
This current tactical response was developed in the mid
seventies, and although at the time was seen as a safer option when nothing
else was available, can be seen by today's standards as antiquated if not
highly dangerous. So is there any alternative tactic or device that could be
used more effectively than shield tactics. It would ideally be suitable for
dealing with violent berserk suspects, perhaps intoxicated, possibly armed with
offensive weapons, both in premises and outdoors. Having identified any such
device it would have to be considered whether it would be used with shields or
totally replace the current tactics.
Soon this tactic will be
revised and altered to include the use of CS spray, as a tactical option with
shields. Such new tactics are unlikely to be any more advantageous than current
shield tactics and indeed may even be in some circumstance disadvantageous.
This is due to the associated cross contamination problems of CS, combined with
the fact that such deployments are highly likely to involve suspects either
suffering from mental illness or intoxication, the very category of individual
likely to be unaffected by CS. Any use of CS irritant in a confined area
without the use of protective respirators in my opinion will lead to a high degree
of officer contamination and jeopardise further officer safety.
Non Lethal V's Firearms
The use of non-lethal
weapons tactics leads us on to the issue of conflict surrounding non-lethal
weapons V's firearms. When examining non-lethal options we have to look and see
where such tactics fit in around the concept and use of lethal force i.e.
firearms. Firstly these devices should not be considered when facing any
suspect that is armed with a firearm nor should they be considered in armed
rapid intervention and hostage rescue. They are not designed for such use and
are entirely inappropriate.
Current ACPO guidelines on
the issue of firearms state:
" Firearms are to
be issued only where there is reason to suppose that a police officer may have
to face a person who is armed or otherwise so dangerous that they could not
safely be restrained without the use of firearms..."
This highlights a grey area
where a non-compliant suspect who is violent and dangerous and armed with a
sharp or blunt edged weapon poses no immediate threat to life. It could be
construed that under ACPO guideline's firearm officers such as an Armed
Response Vehicle crews may be deployed to deal with such a scenario (so
dangerous they cannot be restrained without the use of firearms). As there is
no immediate threat to life there is no justification to use firearms against
the suspect. Granted if the situation escalates and there is an immediate
threat to life (whether it is to police or public), there may be justification
to use lethal force as a last resort. However if there were no escalation in
such scenarios, and therefore no immediate threat, the current shield option
would probably be deployed with all the associated risks. Therefore there needs
to be a new option, a non-lethal device, which allows officers to initially
maintain some distance between the suspect and police. If it then becomes
necessary to attempt to incapacitate the suspect, the distance can be
maintained until the suspect falls down or becomes compliant, allowing officers
to go forward and detain the suspect with minimum risk to themselves and the
suspect.
The reluctance of UK police
firearms departments to examine the use of non-lethal devices is understandable
for a specialist unit, which may have to justify the use of lethal force in any
individual case. This is a genuine concern, which is misconceived. It is
inevitable that in any such legal argument the defence will seek to establish
that lethal force was not justified. A strength in the use of such an option
would be the fact that other non-lethal tactics had been considered, but were
unlikely to succeed, or had been tried and failed. This falls in line with
current ACPO guidelines on the use of firearms:
"Firearms are to be
fired by... police officers only as a last resort where conventional methods
have been tried and failed or must from the nature of the circumstances be
unlikely to succeed if tried."
Non-lethal devices should
not be seen to be replacing in any way the use of justifiable lethal force.
They should be seen to be bridging the current gap in our tactical response
when dealing with violent scenarios. Granted some non-lethal devices by their
nature and design are better suited for use by firearms officers. This would
purely be from a training point of view combined with a familiarity of the
concept of some devices. However if firearms officers were deployed in such
circumstances they should not necessarily be viewed as being deployed in a
firearms role. They would be specialist officers fulfilling a secondary role.
In essence replacing or complementing the current tactical shield option.
Obviously the type of non-lethal weapon deployed would dictate such conditions.
Current legislation and police guidelines will probably dictate that devices
such as kinetic energy rounds, would be viewed as firearms. Thus generating
areas of conflict surrounding their issue and use under current ACPO
recommendations.
Conclusions
In recent years policing in
the UK has taken vast steps to bring modern policing methods dealing with
officer safety into practise. The issuing of long batons, body armour and CS
spray can be seen as vital steps in providing individual officers with means of
protecting themselves in violent circumstances. However despite these efforts
we are still using out of date tactics and methods of incapacitating suspects
who threaten and use extreme levels of violence against officers on a regular
basis. The fact that we still use shield tactics when dealing with suspects,
who are potentially the most extremely violent and highly dangerous individuals
in society, is almost criminally negligent. Both in terms of police safety, as
well as safety of the public.
The summer will see the
introduction of Health and Safety directives in the form of generic risk
assessment. The risk officers' face in the current tactical deployment of
shields may not be construed as meeting with the requirements of the incoming
legislation. Surely it is our duty to examine other means, not only to give the
protection and equipment that police officers deserve, but also they should
have by law. It is the responsibility of the Commissioner and every Chief
Constable to give every officer the best protection that is available. In my
opinion this is quite clearly NOT the case.
Many options exist
and are available that have not been tested or researched in the UK. There
seems to be sadly little interest and imagination in developing new tactics,
and subsequently to date CS aerosol incapacitant, batons and shields are the
only approved options for dealing with violent suspects. I do not believe this
is due to the lack of enthusiasm of certain individuals, but due to premature
judgements and dismissals given by the establishment itself. The whole concept
of less than lethal devices is met with much scepticism and wariness, both from
senior management and Home Office scientists. This is mainly born out of a lack
of understanding and ignorance of the subject, combined with an unwillingness
to change. Of those few alternatives that have had some consideration, and
subsequently rejected (such as pepper spray (OC)). The evidence suggests that
this may be mainly due to the sway of politicians, civil servants and scientist
who seem to dictate and rule the process. All of whom are least likely to find
themselves placed at risk or in physical danger. Their objections may soon be
swept away by the advent of a growing awareness amongst police officers, of the
legal requirements to ensure that Health & Safety at work is properly
assessed and provided for. With the reminder that litigation is not only open
to suspects, but also to those who are not properly protected!
The growing concern of
individual officers rightly concerned with their own safety identifies the need
to reduce the opportunity for violence by the use of devices which incapacitate
or reduce the potential for a suspect to harm himself or others. Unfortunately
it can be construed that the current lack of knowledge and the absence of other
non-lethal options in the armoury of the police response, will increase the
clamour for defensive arming of the British police force. Lethargy on the part
of those with the power to implement change may ironically provide the result
that they themselves and many rank and file officers do not want. The arming of
the UK police.
Therefore are CS, batons
and shields enough in the less than lethal arsenal. Certainly for the mentally
ill, intoxicated and dangerously determined suspect I believe the answer is
irrefutably no. I only hope that it does not take another police officers death
or injury to prove that.
Contact
Copyright Nicholas MacKay
1998
E-Mail : lesslethal@ntlworld.com